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A B S T R A C T
The measure of a household's income should include not only monetary components but also non-monetary
components and in-kind benefits, such as imputed rent. Imputed rent is the rent an owner can expect to receive
were the house on the rental market. This study examined the impact of net imputed rent on the distribution of
income in a spatial context. The spatial impact of net imputed rent, mortgage payments, private rent, public rent
(social housing schemes) and reverse mortgage/annuity on the spatial distribution of disposable income was
examined for the year 2011. A spatial microsimulation model, simulated model of the Irish local economy
(SMILE), was used to simulated disposable income at a detailed spatial scale. Rental and property values are
estimated at a spatial scale adopting the kriging methodology. The created rental and property data were merged
into the SMILE simulated dataset to examine the impact of housing on the spatial distribution of disposable
income at a small area level. Results show that the imputed cash flows from property ownership decreases the
income share of those at the bottom of the income distribution and is inequality increasing, except in the case of
those aged 65 +. Spatially the benefits of housing are greatest in urban areas where property values are highest.
The small area measurements of imputed rent highlight the dis-equalising impact imputed rent and housing
wealth has on inequality; the rich being able to consume more housing.
1. Introduction
Consumer durables can provide a stream of benefits to owners
(Barr, 1998), which can increase a household's potential to consume
(Atkinson, 1983). A comprehensive measure of welfare should include
the consumption value derived from consumer durables like housing
(Smeeding and Weinberg, 2001). Ireland is used as a case study, to
examine the impact of housing costs and benefits on the spatial dis-
tribution of income.
A broader definition of household income will include more than
employment income but also include non-monetary components and in-
kind benefits such as imputed rent (Frick and Grabka, 2003; Frick et al.,
2007). Two aspects of housing make it interesting, its costs and bene-
fits. The costs are in the form of; rent, mortgage payments or house
purchase and benefits; imputed rent and reverse mortgage payments
(Nakajima and Telyukova, 2014). Being an owner-occupier does not
provide a rental income however, it saves the owner from having to pay
market rent (Atkinson, 1983). This should be reflected in total house-
hold income.
Net imputed rent consists of gross imputed rent, less any ex-
penditure on maintenance and mortgage interest paid (Frick et al.,
2007). For gross imputed rent, the market rent for a similar type
dwelling, should be used (UN, 1977). This reflects the hedonic nature of
housing (Rosen, 1974). The Canberra Group (UN, 2011) proposed
guidelines on how to measure household income and believes in-kind
gains such as, property income from net imputed rent should be in-
cluded. Since 2008, imputed rent and reverse mortgage/annuity values
are included in the United Nations system of national accounts
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(UN, 2008), while the Central Statistics Office (CSO), Ireland publish a
net imputed rent measure in the national accounts (CSO, 2011) how-
ever this is at an aggregated spatial scale.
Previous studies found imputed rent to have an equalising effect on
the income distribution (Saunders and Siminski, 2005; Fessler et al.,
2016), these studies however, have been restricted to an aspatial scale
due to a lack of income data with a spatial component (Balcázar et al.,
2014). Aspatial analysis of imputed rent ignores the spatial variation in
house prices. If poor people live-in low-cost areas and rich people live in
high cost areas, then the distributional effects of adding imputed rent
(as an ‘income’ source) to household income cannot be measured ac-
curately with nationwide imputations as there are large variation be-
tween areas.
Regional science offers explanations as to how and why variations
in wages and house prices exist across space across space.
Thünen (1826) recognised that an interaction exists between space and
the economy, the rent for agricultural land rent is a function of yield per
unit of land and transport costs. The Alonso (1964), Muth (1969) and
Mills (1972) model extended von Thünen's model to an urban en-
vironment. This is based on the idea that differences in commuting
costs are traded off with differences in the price of living space
(Brueckner, 1987). Alonso used bid rent curves to show how house-
holds with a given income and set of preferences seek to trade-off the
costs and nuisance of commuting, with the advantages of cheaper land
with increasing distance to the city centre and the satisfaction of having
more living space (Alonso, 1960). The densities, location and prices of
urban land are all determined simultaneously. Rich households will
have flatter bid rent curves compared to poor households, they also
have a higher consumption for housing which attracts them to the
suburbs. (Brueckner et al., 1999). At any given location the rich can
afford more land and other goods compared to poor households. Poor
households are less concerned with the price and quantity of land and
more focused on cost and inconvenience of commuting - “Accessibility
behaves as an inferior good” (Alonso, 1960).
Regional wage differences can be explained by differences in local
amenities (Roback, 1982) and agglomeration economies (Rosenthal and
Strange, 2004). The Rosen–Roback specification defines a spatial
equilibrium where differences in housing costs account for differences
in income and amenities for each individual (Glaeser and
Gyourko, 2005). Individuals are trading-off commuting, housing and
income simultaneously to maximize their welfare. The spatial pattern of
amenities in a city can help to explain why rich income groups live at
central locations or in the suburbs. When the level of amenities in the
centre are high the rich are more likely to live there (Brueckner et al.,
1999). Holding human capital constant, high wages result in higher
costs to firms. The spatial equilibrium suggests there is advantages to
firms in high wage areas, which offset the costs of conducting business
(Glaeser, 2007). Spatial models capture the fact that the residuals
produced by hedonic house price equations are often spatially corre-
lated (Balcázar et al., 2017). Despite the availability of detailed house
information, previous studies on small area imputed rent have been
constrained by a lack of income data at a small area level.
Examining the spatial differences in income and house prices and
how they impact on a household's overall level of income is the main
objective of this study. A spatial microsimulation approach is used to
overcome the lack of income data at a small area level
(O'Donoghue et al., 2013a). This dataset is combined with a kriging
methodology (Brunsdon and Comber, 2015) to calculate the spatial
impact of net imputed rent on the spatial distribution of income.
1.1. Policy context
There had been criticism towards the bias that existed in Ireland
surrounding owner-occupation (OECD, 2006), particularly the in-
centivisation of home ownership in rural areas (Gkartzios and
Shucksmith, 2015). This resulted in increased calls for the introduction
of a property tax (Daly et al., 2009). In an Irish context, the Income Tax
Act of 1967 taxed income from the letting of a property or the imputed
rent to the owner-occupier. This tax was later abolished in 1969. A
domestic rates system had been in place in Ireland since the mid-19th
century. These rates were used to fund local government and were
based on the valuation of the property. Rates however, were calculated
based on the level of funding the local government required for its
annual budget. This system was abolished in 1978 (Daly et al., 2009). In
2013, a local property tax (LPT) was introduced (Walsh, 2013). The LPT
is a self-assessed tax and it is the responsibility of the owner to select the
correct band in which they believe their property belongs to. The LPT
website contains some guidance for homeowners; however, the bands
are wide with little information given in relation to housing char-
acteristics. This tax can capture some of the in-kind benefits from
owner-occupation; however, the tax is on all residential properties in-
cluding those who rent privately. Callan et al. (2010) recommended an
income exemption were a property tax introduced, however the current
tax does not discriminate based on income.
When measuring net imputed rent, it is important to consider the
underlying structures that exist in a country (Frick and Grabka, 2003;
Norris and Winston, 2012). This requires detailed spatial micro data
(Meen, 2012). Failure to account for differences in housing systems
between two countries (Fahey and Maître, 2004), can lead to invalid
conclusions and comparisons (Smeeding and Weinberg, 2001). For
example, it is widely acknowledged that mortgage tax relief has
minimal impact on ownership percentage (Hendershott and
White, 2000), as higher income groups disproportionally capture most
of the gains (Matsaganis and Flevotomou, 2007). Such a tax relief is
also inequitable towards renters (Bourassa and Grigsby, 2000). In Ire-
land, which can be defined as having a liberal welfare state regime
(Kemeny, 2002), rent prices and imputed rent are expected to be higher
compared to countries where the market plays a less important role
(Juntto and Reijo, 2010). The Canberra group handbook (UN, 2011)
and the OECD Framework (OECD, 2013) has attempted to create a
standardised cross-country measure of household income.
2. Methodology
2.1. Income definition
There are several economic advantages to owner-occupation. The
benefit of owner-occupation is twofold, first there is the benefit from
not paying private market rent. In many cases, monthly mortgage
payments are lower compared to the rent for a similar dwelling
(Lyons, 2017a). Secondly, the owned property is a valuable asset which
can represent a considerable portion of a household's wealth, Venti and
Wise (1991) estimate that housing equity represents as much as 80% of
the wealth of elderly households, many of whom are ‘cash-poor and
house-rich’ (Costa-Font et al., 2010). Owner-occupiers can use the
purchase of a property as an investment rather than investing in fi-
nancial services (Frick and Grabka, 2003). Later in the life-cycle,
owner-occupiers benefit from this investment in the form of a reverse
mortgage offered by investment firms. A reverse mortgage/annuity
(RMA) enables owner-occupiers to use their home as equity to buy an
annuity which provide them with regular payments, without the need
to move out or sell the house therefore providing security of tenure
(Mayer and Simons, 1994). The loan is then repaid with interest, upon
the homeowner's death or if they decide to sell. Unlike a mortgage, the
homeowner does not make interest or principal payments. The monthly
payment received depends upon; the borrower's age and life ex-
pectancy, the amount of equity in the home, the expected level of house
price appreciation and the interest rate on the loan (Mayer and
Simons, 1994). Despite the benefits of RMA in decreasing poverty
amongst the elderly (Kutty, 1998; Mayer and Simons, 1994), the de-
mand remains low and the reasons for this are not well understood
(Cocco and Lopes, 2014).
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Without including reverse mortgage/annuity in the analysis the
household would leave behind a significant amount of equity which is
then bequeathed to descendants contributing to inequality
(Piketty et al., 2014). Reverse mortgage/annuity payments are included
so that the true value of the asset is not underestimated. There are also
life-cycle effects, households are at different stages on the life-cycle and
will have saved or inherited more wealth than others (Atkinson, 1971;
Shorrocks, 1975).
Under the Haig-Simons definition, income is equal to consumption
plus change in net worth over the course of the year (Smeeding and
Weinberg, 2001). If this annual approach is adopted households at
different stages of the life-cycle are being compared to each other. In-
cluding both annual and lifetime approach aspects is more intuitive. A
number of assumptions are made as you are forecasting over a longer
time period (Barthold, 1993). Using reverse mortgage/annuity however
treats households as separate units as the household will consume the
value of the property before death. Households can overconsume to
make up for periods of under consumption, i.e. when paying a mort-
gage.
Net imputed rent is proven to decrease inequality and reduce pov-
erty especially for the elderly (Törmälehto and Sauli, 2013). Several
studies found that by including wealth indicators such as imputed rent,
the living standards for the elderly increase (Frick and Headey, 2009;
Callan and Keane, 2009; Pellegrino et al., 2011). A tax on imputed rent
may not necessarily be progressive, especially in countries where the
elderly have lower cash incomes compared to other groups (i.e. cash
poor, asset rich) (Figari et al., 2016; Pellegrino et al., 2011; Yates,
1994). Sometimes households are unable to provide their own dwelling
and rely on the State to provide housing. Paulus et al., (2010) state this
public transfer in-kind would have to be paid out of disposable income,
were it not provided publicly by the state. The benefits of imputed rent
to social renters are found to be substantial, decreasing poverty rates as
much as 10% (Grabka and Verbist, 2015).
2.2. SMILE
This paper adopts a spatial microsimulation approach to overcome
the lack of published income data at a detailed spatial scale. Census
data typically has a spatial component but no income information,
whereas surveys typically have individual incomes but no spatial in-
formation. This study utilises the simulated model of the Irish local
economy (SMILE), which uses a data fusion process to match micro data
using a statistical algorithm with census data, to generate spatial micro
data (O'Donoghue et al., 2013a).
The SMILE model uses a Quota Sampling (QS) methodology, de-
veloped by Farrell et al. (2010), (2013). QS is less computationally
intensive compared to Simulated Annealing (SA) or Iterative Propor-
tional Fitting (IPF) (Farrell et al., 2013; Hynes et al., 2009). QS re-
weights survey data according to Census quotas for each area. Micro
data is first randomly ordered, this data is sampled until the quotas - set
by the constraint variables from the census - are filled.
In the SMILE procedure, a limited number of constraint variables
are chosen to improve computational efficiency and non-convergence.
The constraining variables used in SMILE are gender, education level,
age group and household size. These variables were used so that an
accurate number of households per district are selected. Regressing the
main desired analytical variable, household disposable income, against
potential match variables, an R2 value is calculated.
The first stage of the modelling procedure involves filling the quotas
for the individual's most at risk of underrepresentation. Demographic
characteristics of those households at risk of being underrepresented in
the model are identified. This allows for these households to be filled
first with all constraints used. A random distribution of households
sorted by household size is created. Using this ordering ensures an ac-
curate number of households. This stage ends when no further house-
holds can be assigned. The next stage involves the creation of a
demographic profile of those quotas unfilled. At this stage quotas have
reached 95% accuracy. A constraint is removed after each iteration
until the quotas are filled. The spatial microsimulation procedure is
complete when a selection of individuals from the micro dataset can
reproduce the SAPS tables with a less than 5% difference. The output
file for each district contains the same number of individuals and
households as in the SAPS, this ensures that it can be spatially ag-
gregated and disaggregated by ED, county or province. The remaining
variables in the microdata set are merged into the simulated data based
on the common individual and household identifier.
2.3. Validation
To test the reliability and credibility of the simulated data it is ne-
cessary to validate the model. This involves in-sample and out-of-
sample validation. The in-sample validation involves comparing the
proportion generated using the simulated data with the proportion
generated using SAPS data. Such in-sample validation can be used as
the variables overlap between the two datasets.
Where data did not previously exist, out-of-sample validation is
used. This method of validation involves comparing the synthetic data
with new external data. The data in both datasets is aggregated to the
same spatial scale. In the case of the SMILE model, at-risk of poverty
estimates from Watson (2005) are used. Poverty estimates from SMILE
simulated data, are compared with estimates from external data.
One of the major issues with spatial microsimulation is in relation to
the non-overlapping variables which are likely to suffer from un-
explained spatial heterogeneity. As mentioned earlier the overlapping
variables in SMILE are age, sex, education and number of persons per
household. Non-overlapping or unconstrained variables include labour
market variables such as occupation, employment status in addition to
housing variables; have a mortgage, renting etc. An out-of-sample va-
lidation of the unconstrained variables against new external data
highlighted substantial variability in the correlations amongst the un-
constrained variables. A Monte-Carlo Simulation approach is adopted in
SMILE to correct some of these issues (O'Donoghue et al., 2013a). It
uses nested equations which mainly relate to the labour market. A set of
parameters are estimated which relate to the explained part of the
equation, an error term is also included. Without the error term the
calibration method will only select those with a high probability of
having certain characteristics, i.e. based on a combination of char-
acteristics it would go with the most probable. Even after this process
there may still be unexplained spatial heterogeneity. The unconstrained
variables may have a poor relationship with the constrained variables.
To overcome this, the variables simulated during the Monte-Carlo Si-
mulation are calibrated to exogenous constraints. These external totals
used in this calibration process are from census small area data. Cor-
relation coefficients are calculated between the SMILE data and the
external data for each of the labour market variables. These results are
adjusted so they match the external data.
2.4. Household income
This process is followed by an alignment procedure whereby market
incomes are readjusted to be representative of national accounts. In
calibrating income, attention is required as adjustments can have im-
plications on the distribution. A ratio of average income by source to
the national average is utilised in the SMILE model to ensure the un-
derlying distribution of incomes remains (Morrissey and
O'Donoghue, 2011). The synthetic data is also calibrated to be con-
sistent with county level income data from the CSO national accounts.
Absolute values are used so that the distributional characteristics of the
survey data are maintained. This calibrating allows for unobserved
spatial heterogeneity and ensures the same CSO county ratios are
maintained (O'Donoghue et al., 2013b).
A spatial microsimulation methodology has enabled a spatially rich
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micro-dataset be created. This dataset contains individual level data on
socio-economic and demographic characteristics as well as income
measures such as market income, disposable income, taxes paid and
social transfers received (Morrissey and O'Donoghue, 2013). The cali-
bration and alignment techniques ensure that the data presented in
SMILE is representative. The disposable income measure created con-
sists of income generated from employment, non-work income such as
income generated from investments, social benefits and less any taxes.
Y w f b ti i i i i= + +
Where Yi is an individual's total personal income, wi is employment
income, fi is non-employment income such as investments, bi are social
benefits and ti any taxes (includes tax on employment income, non-
employment income and social benefits). The SMILE model accounts for
the complex nature of the tax-benefit system. Income is modelled net of
taxes and benefits. A static microsimulation model of the Irish tax-
benefit system was developed (O'Donoghue et al., 2013a). In Ireland a
number of similar models have been developed such as the SWITCH
model (Callan et al., 1996) as part of a European tax-benefit model
(O'Donoghue, 1998). A simplified Tax-Benefit microsimulation model
was programmed in Stata to model the spatial distribution of income
net of taxes and benefits. This model is consistent with other publicly
available models such as EUROMOD.
2.5. Household composition
Equivalence scales are used to take account of the varying compo-
sition of households (Atkinson, 1983). Income is measured using an
equivalence scale to take account of the need of the household. Dif-
ferent equivalence scales exist (OECD, 2014) however, the national
equivalence scale is used as it is the one widely used by the CSO for
Survey on Income Living Conditions (SILC) reports and published data
used in the creation of SMILE. This scale gives a weighting of 1 to the
first adult in the household and 0.66 to each subsequent adult (> 14
years). Children (< 14 years) are each assigned a weighting of 0.33.
The equivalised household disposable income is then calculated for
each household using the household total weighting (CSO, 2014).
The household disposable income from SMILE is used as the base
measure. Various house components are then added to household in-
come; private rent, public rent (social housing), mortgage costs, im-
puted rent and reverse mortgage/annuity. A cross-sectional examina-
tion of the year 2011 is the focus of this study. This is the latest year for
which SMILE model income data is available.
2.6. Property values
A number of methodologies can be used to estimate imputed rent
Fig. 1. PRTB Rental locations geocoded.
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(see Balcazar et al., (2014)). A literature review proved inconclusive in
identifying the best method. Spatial models capture the fact that the
residuals produced by hedonic house price equations are often spatially
correlated (Balcázar et al., 2017). Despite the availability of detailed
house information, previous studies have been constrained by a lack of
income data at a spatial scale. Using a spatial microsimulation approach
has overcome this problem. Using a kriging methodology, house and
rental prices at a detailed spatial scale are estimated. The kriging
methodology is used to interpolate or smooth the spatial data
(Diggle et al., 1998). Kriging operates on best linear unbiased predic-
tion (BLUP) (Goldberger, 1962) and accounts for spatially correlated
data. Kriging provides better estimates over other interpolation
methods; nearest neighbour interpolation, inverse distance weighting,
pycnophylactic interpolation (Anselin and Lozano-Gracia, 2008).
Kriging assumes the variance-covariance matrix can be estimated as
a function of distance only. When applied, kriging creates a smooth
interpolation surface between data points. The variance-covariance
matrix is estimated by computing a variogram (Pace et al., 1998). The
pair-wise squared differences among all errors, are plotted against the
distance between the pair points (Bailey and Gatrell, 1995). There is a
boundary where the distance is greatest and at which the value of one
point is related to the value of another point (Hoshino and
Kuriyama, 2010). As distance increases the covariance converges to-
wards zero. The points beyond this range will have zero impact on the
points inside the range or boundary. In kriging a greater weight is given
to points which are closer in distance to the dependant (Dubin et al.,
1999) following Tobler's Law (Tobler, 1970). Kriging is often used to
estimate real estate values (Hoshino and Kuriyama, 2010; Pace et al.,
1998; Dubin et al., 1999, 1992; Basu and Thibodeau, 1998; Montero
and Larraz, 2010).
The rental data used is from the Residential Tenancies Board (RTB)
(PRTB, 2011) rental index. Under the Residential Tenancies Act (2004)
landlords are legally obligated to register with the RTB. The dataset
compiled by the ESRI, began in 2007 and is based upon the RTB's
register (which contains 284,038 registered landlord properties) of te-
nancies. The database is the largest rental index in Ireland and is po-
pulated with information on actual/agreed rent (assuming all landlords
are compliant), location,1 six categories of dwelling types, accom-
modation size and number of occupants and tenancy length.
For the year 2011 the published RTB data contains 393 rental data
locations, with a higher frequency of points in urban areas. Each lo-
cation represents the average rent received in a catchment area and
contains data broken down by property type and number of bedrooms.
This rental location data was geocoded using An Post's Geodirectory
database. The address points contained only limited address string data.
These data were geocoded manually based on the location detail pro-
vided, typically a town or parish name. Using ArcGIS software all
properties in the Geodirectory were plotted. A search was performed
using each address to highlight each Geodirectory property where there
was a match. The weighted centre point of a cluster of addresses was
chosen. In towns and villages, the address ‘main street’, ‘church street’
or ‘square’ was selected as this represents the centre point of the area.
The rental points are plotted in the software programme ′R′. Using
the kriging methodology the variogram (Fig. 1) is estimated. The var-
iogram is fitted to the data to determine the range, sill and nugget
[Fig. 2]. Beyond a distance of 76.3 km rental points no longer have an
effect on the interpolated value. A rental value for each of the 3,409 EDs
is estimated using the centroid point of the polygon. The output from
kriging is an estimation of private rent for an area, broken down by
property type and number of bedrooms.
These estimated values are used in the model to represent both
private rental and imputed rent prices. Social housing rents are calcu-
lated using rent supplement values from the Department of Social
Fig. 2. Estimated variogram from the kriging methodology (distance in metres).
1 Data is aggregated and reported at an unusual parish/barony hybrid ad-
ministrative boundary scale.
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Protection (DSP, 2011). The maximum band value for the area is used.
The estimated private rental value is subtracted from the band value to
calculate the imputed rent benefit to those in social housing.
Mortgage repayment costs are estimated using average house prices
over time. The Department of Housing, Planning and Local Government
(DOHPLG) gather average house price data based on mortgage
approval data (Department of Housing, 2016). Although the data has
information on actual house sales, it lacks spatial detail. Values are
broken down by year (1971–2016) and by several categories; national,
Dublin, Cork, Galway, Limerick, Waterford and other areas. The
averages for new houses which represents a three-bedroom semi-de-
tached house is used (DoHPLG, 2017). Data from the property website
Daft.ie are used to disaggregate at a detailed spatial scale (35 units) and
break down prices by number of bedrooms (Lyons, 2011). Property
prices are then modelled based on the relationship between the three-




















Where c is location, i is number of bedrooms and t is the year. Prop is
the value of the property, Rent is the ED rental value, Med_Rent is the
median county rental value, Department is the DOHPLG property value
and Daft is the Daft.ie property list price. Taking this approach account
for differences in house prices between EDs.




Disposable income Equivalised household disposable income
Housing costs Private rent costs + social housing costs +
mortgage costs
Imputed rent Imputed rent household receives
Net imputed rent Imputed rent—Housing costs
Reverse mortgage/annuity Must own house outright (no mortgage)
Net housing Imputed Rent—Housing costs + reverse mortgage/
annuity (RMA)
P. Kilgarriff et al. Journal of Housing Economics 43 (2019) 118–130
123
The Department of Housing gather average house price data based
on mortgage approval data (Department of Housing, 2016). The data is
presented is an average for a three-bedroom semi-detached house. Al-
though the data has information on actual house sales, it lacks spatial
detail. Values are broken down by year (1971–2016) and by several
categories; national, Dublin, Cork, Galway, Limerick, Waterford and
other areas. We use the averages for new houses which represents a
three-bedroom semi-detached house. In tandem with this dataset data
from the Daft.ie (Lyons, 2017b) is used which contains more detailed
spatial information. The report contains average house list prices
broken down by Local Authority2 and number of bedrooms (1–5).
Combining both data sources together enables the lack of spatial detail
in the Department of Housing data and the lack of actual sales prices in
the Daft.ie data to be overcome.
Fig. 3 shows the highest property values are in the south-west
around Cork city and East around Dublin city. The price differentials in
housing are clearly illustrated in the map across space.
During the spatial microsimulation process mortgage is not used as
a matching variable, this results in limited mortgage data at the
household level. Data from the Central Bank of Ireland (CBI) shows that
28 is the average age at which people typically draw down a mortgage
and 78.7% is the average loan-to-value (LTV) percentage (RTÉ, 2016).
Unfortunately, this data is not available historically. In 2011, the dif-
ference in the interest rate across mortgage types (tracker, variable and
fixed rate) was minimal. To overcome this issue all mortgages are taken
to be variable rate mortgages with the European Central Bank (ECB)
variable rate interest rate for 2011 of 1.25% (ECB, 2016). Using the age
of the head of the household in SMILE and a mortgage drawdown age of
28, the year in which they purchased the house and house price is es-
timated. A LTV rate of 78.7% and Propcit is used to calculate the value of
the mortgage, mortgage repayments and interest on repayments.
Despite RMA typically given to those aged 62 and over (Mayer and
Simons, 1994), an age limit is not applied as any owner-occupier has
the option of a RMA (Rasmussen et al., 1997). The lender can consider
the uncertainty around length-of-life when calculating payments and
use an age-dependant discount rate with later years discounted at an
increasing rate (Fratantoni, 1999). Using this rate, older age categories
will receive higher payments, as these payments are expected over a
shorter period.
2.7. Age group analysis
Table 1 shows the definitions of the various measures used to esti-
mate the impact of housing on inequality and income. Each measure
has been equivalised so a more accurate comparison to equivalised
disposable income can be made.
Table 2 shows income and rent measures broken down by age
group. The elderly has the lowest income across age groups however,
the high levels of imputed rent and annuity compensate for this. After
taking account of housing costs and benefits the 65 + group moves
from having the lowest levels of income to having the highest. Due to
life-cycle effects younger age categories are less likely to own a property
(69% are non-homeowners) and therefore do not benefit from having
reverse mortgage/annuity or imputed rent.
In Table 3 as age increases, the probability that an individual has a
mortgage or is private renting decreases. In the 65 + age category
97.9% are owner-occupiers and only 0.4% are renting. The high %
private renting in the 15–35 age category face two main disadvantages;
they are not paying into an asset and secondly not receiving the in-kind
benefits.
3. Results
Quintiles are used to map the data and results. Each quintile con-
tains an equal number of households. Using quintiles is a means to
reduce the complexity of the data but still be able to identify trends.
Figs. (4) and (5) show the spatial distribution of income before and after
housing costs and benefits are included. Fig. 4 shows a concentration of
wealth in Dublin City and around the cities of Limerick and Cork. After
accounting for housing costs and benefits (Fig. 5), this concentration of
wealth in Dublin has spread into the Greater Dublin Area (GDA) (right
side map and inset), while it has decreased around Limerick and Cork
cities. The increase in wealth in the GDA is largely due to owner-oc-
cupiers benefiting from higher rental and property values. These higher
property values translate into higher net imputed rent and RMA pay-
ments. Table 4 shows that while there is a lower % of owner-occupiers
in Dublin City and County compared to rural areas, the high property
values appear to offset the costs inflicted upon those renting. The high
net imputed rent and annuity values can hide at an aggregate level, the
regressive impact on a particular group.
In Table 5 an examination of the movers (change in quintile)
highlights the lifecycle effects. The areas which move down a quintile
have higher levels of disposable income, lower levels of imputed rent,
younger and well-educated. The areas which move up a quintile tend to
be older, less educated, lower employment and have high imputed rent
and reverse mortgage/annuity values. This lifecycle impact results in
the elderly moving up the income distribution. The elderly benefit from
not paying a mortgage or rent and having a positive net imputed rent.
Their housing benefits overcome their lack of disposable income and
move those in the lower age brackets down a quintile.
Table 6 shows that a lot of the variation in income is occurring
within rather than between regions (county level). Housing costs in-
crease inequality from 0.348 to 0.412 nationally. After accounting for
housing benefits, overall inequality decreases to 0.320. Those paying
housing costs will not receive these benefits. Housing benefits appear to
Table 2
Household median income by age group of households (using age of head of household).











15–35 €13,359 €20,165 €0 €0 €22,126 69.0%
36–50 €21,178 €19,978 €1,359 €3,006 €25,459 29.1%
51–65 €16,266 €19,124 €5,066 €5,846 €30,590 14.2%
65+ €13,942 €16,612 €5,103 €12,060 €38,118 4.3%
15–65 €16,314 €19,686 €1,929 €2,485 €26,004 39.0%
Table 3
Share of housing tenure by age group.






15–35 27.4% 59.6% 10.1% 2.8%
36–50 41.8% 11.2% 21.6% 25.4%
51–65 0.8% 2.0% 10.4% 86.8%
65+ 0.0% 0.4% 1.7% 97.9%
15–65 22.9% 24.2% 13.9% 39.0%
2 Prices are broken down by Local Authority outside of Dublin. Inside Dublin
the Local Authority of Dublin City is split into north and south city. In addition,
Tipperary is not broken into its two local authorities of north and south.
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cancel out the costs, even if we examine at the small area level. It is
important therefore to examine at a household level the impact of
housing and the imputed cash flows from property ownership.
One method is to examine the progressivity of the various housing
measures. Table 7 reports the Gini Index. The Gini index shows the dis-
equalising impact of imputed rent.
The Lorenz curve in Fig. 6 illustrates this. At the lower end of the
income distribution, income net of housing costs and benefits is increasing
inequality but as you increase population share the curves cross and it
starts to reduce inequality at the upper end of the income distribution.
In Table 8, the share of income for those in the bottom and top
decile decreased from 3.1% to 1.4% and 28.5% to 28% respectively.
The middle deciles have experienced the biggest increase in share of
income, with deciles 3–9 all increasing their share. The decrease in
income share for the lower deciles is explained by the low levels of
home ownership. These groups are disadvantaged from paying housing
costs and not receiving same in-kind benefits as owner-occupiers. This
raises the issue of the affordability of housing (Kenna et al., 2016).
Elderly individuals who were in the bottom quintiles (cash poor but
asset rich) have increased their income share after housing costs and
benefits are considered. Overall inequality has increased as the gap
between the bottom deciles and the middle deciles has widened.
In Fig. 7 Anselin Local Moran's I is utilised to identify clusters and
outliers of high/low levels of disposable income after the inclusion of
net imputed rent. This method can identify local spatial associations
which exist in the data. Examining the z-scores and p-values feature by
feature, the measure indicates whether the apparent similarity (spatial
clustering of either high or low values) or dissimilarity (a spatial out-
lier) is more pronounced than you would expect in a random dis-
tribution. For example high-high is a statistically significant cluster of
high values (ESRI, 2018).
The spatial distribution shows concentrations of high-high (HH)
clusters around the GDA in the east of the map and a smaller area
around Cork city in the south. There is a line of low-low (LL) clusters
running from south-east through the midlands and up towards the
north-west.
Utilising the information in Table 9, clusters are described based on
their characteristics.
Fig. 4. Quintiles of median equivalised household disposable income (Dublin inset).
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LL: Low income, high levels of younger and older people, less
educated, more unemployment, sparsely populated. Label: Remote
rural areas.
LH: Low income, younger, least educated, highest unemployment,
densely populated. Label: inner city areas of poverty and deprivation.
HL: Higher incomes, highest owner occupation rates, high levels of
Fig. 5. Quintiles of median equivalised household disposable income including housing costs and benefits (Dublin inset).
Table 4
Housing tenure by urban-rural classification (Population units in households).
Location Population % Social housing Private renting Owner outright Has mortgage Owner occupier
Rural 16% 14% 16% 54% 17% 71%
Village (200–1499) 15% 13% 18% 52% 18% 69%
Town (1500–2999) 6% 10% 17% 54% 19% 73%
Town (3000–4999) 3% 10% 16% 55% 19% 74%
Town (5000–9999) 6% 11% 20% 51% 18% 69%
Town 10,000+) 17% 11% 22% 49% 18% 68%
Waterford 1% 11% 21% 50% 18% 67%
Galway 2% 9% 23% 45% 23% 68%
Limerick 1% 15% 19% 49% 17% 66%
Cork 4% 10% 21% 50% 18% 69%
Dublin county 12% 11% 24% 45% 19% 64%
Dublin city 17% 10% 19% 51% 20% 70%
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youth and elderly, middle level of education, lowest unemployment,
sparsely populated. Label: Recreational or leisure areas.
HH: Highest incomes, young professionals, highest education levels,
high employment rate, densely populated. Label: Middle class city and
suburbs.
A comparison of the two largest clusters HH and LL highlight the
urban/rural divide. Those living in urban environments benefit from
high employment incomes and higher net imputed rent. However, this
is not the case for all urban areas as Galway, Limerick and Waterford
cities do not contain any HH clusters. Within the cities of Cork and
Dublin the LH cluster has identified pockets of deprivation. This high-
lights the usefulness of spatial imputed rent as a tool for deprivation
analysis.
4. Conclusion
Previous studies of imputed rent have been restricted to an aspatial
scale due to a lack of income data with a spatial component
(Balcázar et al., 2014). Using aggregated measures of imputed rent
ignores the variation that exists across space. As rich people consume
more property, they will have larger imputed rents, this causes imputed
rent to have an overall dis-equalising impact. As this study has shown,
this can be illustrated using spatially disaggregated data. Utilising
spatial microsimulation (O'Donoghue et al., 2013a) and spatial analysis
methods has made it possible to examine imputed rent at a small area
level.
The importance of including in-kind benefits in the calculation of
disposable income and household welfare is clear. Owner-occupied
housing greatly increases a household's potential to consume. After
accounting for housing costs in the form of rent and mortgage payments
and housing benefits in the form of imputed rent and reverse mortgage/
annuity, the spatial distribution of welfare changes. On average the
income share of the GDA increases, however when the movers are ex-
amined, the high rents and property values and overall benefits to
owner occupiers in the GDA, are masking the high costs young renters
face. This highlights the importance of examining issues such as
housing inequality at a detailed spatial scale as opposed to aggregate
totals. However, overall the net gain to owner-occupiers does not ex-
ceed the net loss to non-owner-occupiers and inequality nationally in-
creases. The inequality measures show that overall housing costs and
benefits are having a regressive impact on the income distribution with
those at the lower end of the income distribution disproportionately
affected. The income share of lower groups decreases after net imputed
rent.
Inequality however, is not increasing for all age groups and there
are clear benefits for older age categories. Reverse mortgage/annuity
has the potential to financially protect households 65 + by acting as an
additional pension they have paid into over the term of the mortgage
(Moscarola et al., 2015). Using a reverse mortgage/annuity the asset is
drawn down until death. Like previous studies, the stream of con-
sumption value provided by housing, compensates the elderly who are
‘cash poor but asset rich’.
Table 5
Characteristics of electoral divisions before and after the inclusion of housing
costs and benefits and the movers. Up 2 are the EDs that moved up 2 or more
quintiles after the inclusion of housing costs and benefits.
Before After Movers (quintiles)
Q1 Q5 Q1 Q5 Up 2 Down 2
Median disposable
income
16,490 29,416 17,009 27,579 17,722 21,119
Median net housing 25,090 44,190 23,778 44,046 30,363 25,183
Mean social rent 503 635 517 646 474 499
Mean private rent 821 2,085 932 1,835 839 1,581
Mean mortgage costs 480 1,938 500 1,570 565 937
Mean imputed rent 3,796 7,902 3,425 7,970 4,995 3,535
Mean RMA 4,922 11,252 4,059 11,865 7,220 3,264
% Family 17.9% 10.0% 20.2% 10.0% 14.1% 23.1%
% Owner Occ. 54.6% 51.6% 50.3% 55.9% 60.6% 40.1%
Child depend. 33.7% 24.1% 35.6% 24.8% 30.4% 38.7%
Old age depend. 23.3% 19.7% 20.3% 23.6% 26.4% 11.9%
Tertiary Educ. 29.2% 45.8% 30.1% 42.9% 31.6% 38.4%
Employ. rate 56.4% 64.4% 56.7% 62.5% 58.2% 62.3%
Unemp. rate 14.3% 8.6% 14.4% 9.0% 12.2% 12.6%
Work age Shr. 63.9% 70.3% 64.3% 68.1% 64.1% 66.9%
Pop. density 312 4,034 201 3,708 815 824
Table 6
Theil I2 index of disposable income+ or–the various housing costs and bene-
fits.
Variable I2 Between Within Between % Within %
Disposable income 0.348 0.014 0.334 4% 96%
-Costs 0.412 0.012 0.400 3% 97%
+ Imputed rent 0.278 0.017 0.261 6% 94%
-Costs+ imputed rent 0.327 0.015 0.311 5% 95%
+Reverse mortgage
annuity
0.301 0.020 0.281 7% 93%
+/-Net costs & benefits 0.320 0.022 0.298 7% 93%
Table 7
Gini Index of housing measures at the household level.
Disposable Income Imputed Rent Net Imputed Rent
Gini 0.37159 0.37339 .38595
Fig. 6. Population Lorenz curves of equivalised Income Before and After
Housing Costs and Benefits.
Table 8
Decile shares of disposable income, minus costs (rent & mortgage) plus imputed
























1 48.9 29.1 29.3 3.1 1.0 1.4
2 59.4 57.6 50.4 4.1 3.6 3.3
3 69.2 74.8 69.7 4.9 5.5 5.0
4 83.4 87.0 85.4 5.8 6.7 6.4
5 100.0 100.0 100.0 7.0 7.7 7.7
6 121.4 115.3 117.9 8.4 8.9 9.0
7 147.8 135.8 140.6 10.2 10.3 10.6
8 181.9 166.6 170.3 12.5 12.4 12.8
9 235.8 216.8 222.6 15.6 15.6 15.9
10 28.5 28.3 28.0
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In terms of policy implications, a tax on imputed rent should be
examined which may reduce the inequality between those who own a
house and those who are renting. The current LPT is attempting to
address this however the tax is levied on all properties, this is despite
private renters not receiving the same level of benefits from housing as
owner-occupiers. The LPT should account for the variation in housing
benefits across the life-cycle. Effective implementation may incentivise
those in the older age categories to take out a reverse mortgage/an-
nuity. Increased uptake of RMA may result in the older age categories
consuming the housing wealth as opposed to bequeathing. This can
address issues relating to the inequality of inherited wealth
(Atkinson, 1971).
The high rental values particularly in the GDA may hinder an in-
dividual's ability to save and eventually draw down a mortgage.
Solutions are required to increase an individual's potential to save.
There are clear benefits to owner-occupation especially for the elderly.
If current trends of decreasing home ownership levels continue, future
elderly groups will be particularly vulnerable as they would not have
the financial safety net in the form of a housing asset.
Fig. 7. Anselin Local Moran's I Cluster and outlier analysis of disposable income including net imputed rent.
Table 9
Characteristic of clusters of disposable income including net imputed rent.
Median HH HL LL LH
Disposable income 25,463 20,187 17,261 17,037
Imputed rent 40,165 30,389 24,744 24,710
Net imputed 31,200 23,739 20,566 21,945
% Family 11.3% 15.0% 18.9% 15.9%
% Owner Occ 70.5% 74.7% 69.6% 59.9%
Child depend. 25.7% 31.8% 35.3% 33.0%
Old age depend. 20.3% 24.7% 21.7% 13.8%
Tertiary educ. 38.8% 33.0% 30.8% 19.8%
Employ. rate 59.8% 64.1% 58.4% 43.4%
Unemp. rate 11.0% 10.9% 13.5% 20.0%
Work age Shr. 69.2% 64.2% 63.9% 68.8%
Pop. density 3,785 27 71 4,982
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